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 U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80:
 Impact on Refugee Flow from Cuba
 By JOHN SCANLAN and GILBURT LOESCHER
 ABSTRACT: Migration from Cuba to the United States since Castro
 assumed power, and the characterization of those leaving as refugees, have
 been strongly affected by U.S. foreign policy concerns. During the 1959-62
 migration wave, particularly prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion,
 Cubans were welcomed as temporary exiles, likely to topple Castro and
 return home. The second major migration wave began in 1965, in the midst
 of a U.S. campaign for systematically isolating and economically depriving
 Cuba and its citizens. When thousands of those citizens left Cuba, primar-
 ily to improve their economic circumstances and rejoin family members,
 they were welcomed as refugees because of the symbolic value of their
 rejection of Latin America's only communist state. The third migration
 wave occurred in 1980, after a decade of detente and gradually improving
 U.S.-Cuban relations. It served no clear U.S. foreign policy ends and was
 perceived as helping Cuba rid itself of undesirables. Consequently those
 arriving received little public support.
 John Scanlan and Gilburt Loescher served as consultants to the Select Commission on
 Immigration and Refugee Policy and are currently working on a study of U.S. refugee
 admissions policy under a Ford Foundation grant. Both are in residence at the Center of
 International Studies, Princeton University.
 John Scanlan is a member of the faculty of the Notre Dame Law School and assistant
 director of its Centerfor Civil and Human Rights. He has written extensively on legal and
 public policy matters.
 Gilburt Loescher is an assistant professor in the Department of Government and Interna-
 tional Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He is the coeditor of Human Rights and
 American Foreign Policy (1979).
 NOTE: The authors wish to thank Susan Roberts for help in assembling the documentation for this
 article.
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 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1959-80
 ETWEEN 1 January 1959 and 31
 October 1980, over 800,000 Cubans
 entered the United States. The over-
 whelming majority entered outside or-
 dinary immigration channels and were
 afforded special status as de facto or
 officially recognized refugees. Virginia
 Dominguez has noted that it is impossi-
 ble directly to correlate particular out-
 flows of particular refugees leaving Cu-
 ba with specific. political and economic
 events occurring after Castro assumed
 power.' In general terms, however, it is
 possible to relate refugee-creating con-
 ditions in Cuba to U.S. policy directed
 toward the Castro regime, and to relate
 U.S. willingness to accept so many Cu-
 bans as refugees to the objectives of that
 policy.
 Thus after a brief period of strained
 tolerance during 1959-60, U.S.-Cuban
 relations have been marked by continu-
 ous mutual hostility and distrust, only
 partially relieved by normalization initia-
 tives undertaken by the Ford and Carter
 administrations. Resulting from this mu-
 tual antagonism have been a polariza-
 tion of U.S.-Cuban relations along an
 East-West axis, accelerated radicaliza-
 tion of the Cuban state, and a series of
 steps undertaken by the United States to
 isolate diplomatically, deprive econom-
 ically, discredit ideologically, or-prior
 to 1965, at least-overthrow violently
 the Castro regime.2 Violent subversion
 dates back at least to the fall of 1959,
 1. Virginia Dominguez, From Neighbor to
 Stranger: The Dilemma of the Caribbean Peoples
 in the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
 versity Press, 1975), p. 21.
 2. "The effort to assassinate Castro began in
 1960 and continued until 1965." U.S. Congress,
 Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental
 Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
 Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
 Leaders: An Interim Report (Washington, DC:
 when the Central Intelligence Agency
 (CIA) was first implicated in bringing
 Cuban counterrevolutionaries to the Uni-
 ted States. Economic deprivation was
 first pursued in July 1960, when Presi-
 dent Eisenhower drastically reduced the
 Cuban sugar quota. Diplomatic isola-
 tion began when the United States, after
 considerable provocation by Castro,
 closed its embassy in Havana on 3 Janu-
 ary 1961. Attempts to discredit the
 Castro regime ideologically began even
 before Cuba normalized its relations
 with the Soviet Union in May 1960, and
 intensified after the unsuccessful Bay of
 Pigs invasion in April 1961. Although
 President Kennedy, in his exchange of
 letters with Khruschev ending the 1962
 Cuban missile crisis, disavowed any
 intention of directly intervening militar-
 ily in Cuba, covert CIA activities aimed
 at Cuba continued, as did attempts to
 pressure all Organization of American
 States members to break off diplomatic
 relations with Cuba and to extend the
 U.S.-initiated boycott of all Cuban com-
 merce to other countries in and outside
 of the Western Hemisphere.
 The politics of hostility have thus
 been multifaceted, with a number of
 means employed simultaneously to under-
 mine the Castro regime. Nevertheless
 those politics, at least to the extent that
 they relate to Cuban migration, fall into
 three distinct eras, each comprehending
 a period of significant flow of Cubans
 into the United States. During the first
 two eras, the admission of Cubans into
 the United States served clear foreign
 policy ends. Thus the arrival of some
 125,000 exiles between January 1959
 Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 255. Over
 100 pages of the report are devoted to CIA in-
 volvement in at least eight assassination attempts
 initiated during this period.
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 and April 1961 was positively regarded,
 since it seemed a temporary phenomenon
 that presaged, with refugee help, the
 forcible removal of Castro from office.
 Similarly the airlift of some 261,000
 Cubans to the United States from 1
 December 1965 through 6 April 1973,
 although accomplishing Castro's goal of
 easing pressure on a beleaguered econ-
 omy and explicitly designed to permit
 exiles to bring family members to the
 United States, also promoted the goals
 of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
 administrations to weaken the Cuban
 economy further and to broadcast the
 ideological bankruptcy of the Castro re-
 gime. The Carter administration also
 made some attempts to draw political
 lessons from the first stages of the
 Mariel boatlift in 1980, indicating, in the
 words of Vice-President Mondale, that
 there "is no better proof of the failure of
 Castro's revolution than the dramatic
 exodus which is currently taking place."3
 However, the 1980 Mariel exodus was
 essentially unique in its failure to serve
 any clearly enunciated and consistently
 held foreign policy goals of the United
 States. Instead, to the extent that it
 served any nation's objectives, that na-
 tion was Cuba.
 THE POLITICS OF EXILE:
 1959-61
 From 1 January 1959 through 31
 December 1960, approximately 100,000
 Cubans arrived in the United States. At
 least 40,000 of them-perhaps as many
 as 70,000-settled in southern Florida.4
 3. White House Press Release, 27 Apr. 1980,
 Bulletin of the Department of State, 80(2039):68
 (June 1980).
 4. All figures on Cuban migration from 1959
 through 1980 are estimates, compiled from a var-
 iety of sources, including Immigration and Natu-
 Despite extensive planning and elabo-
 rate immigration controls regulating the
 entry and final settlement of some 39,000
 Hungarian refugees in 1956-57,5 no sim-
 ilar program was instituted for the larger
 and more concentrated Cuban flow;
 although there was significant and rising
 unemployment in the nation generally
 and in Florida, many of the Cubans
 arrived without adequate means of sup-
 port, and large numbers of Cuban chil-
 dren quickly overwhelmed the Florida
 schools.
 Specifically lacking were detailed secur-
 ity checks prior to admission, any require-
 ment that admittees have guaranteed
 employment in the United States, enlist-
 ment of private voluntary organizations
 (PVOs) in a formalized sponsorship
 program, and any plan to distribute
 geographically-resettle-those entering
 in communities throughout the United
 States. Instead a passive admissions pol-
 icy was followed having the following
 characteristics:
 (1) The consular office in Cuba, which
 remained open until 1 January 1961,
 ralization Service Annual Reports, 1960-78; Max
 Azicri, "The Politics of Exile: Trends and Dynam-
 ics of Political Change among Cuban-Americans,"
 Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos, 11(2)/12(1)
 (July 1981-Jan. 1982); U.S., Congress, Senate,
 Report on the Refugee Act of 1980, Senate Report
 no. 256, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980; and various
 documents of the Cuban Refugee Assistance Pro-
 gram, included in Carlos E. Cortes, ed., Cuban
 Refugee Programs (New York: Arno Press, 1980).
 5. A good account of the controls in effect in
 1956-57, and their partial relaxation in response to
 the Hungarian crisis, is contained in Martin A.
 Bursten, Escape from Fear (Syracuse, NY: Syra-
 cuse University Press, 1958), pp. 51-66. For the
 view that security screening should have been
 more exacting, see Marion T. Bennett, American
 Immigration Policies: A History (Washington,
 DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp. 204-6.
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 119 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1959-80
 issued visas in an expedited and ap-
 parently pro forma manner.
 (2) The Coast Guard made no attempt
 to turn away undocumented Cubans
 who even during this early period
 were arriving quite regularly in small
 boats.
 (3) The Immigration and Naturaliza-
 tion Service (INS) avoided instituting
 deportation proceedings against those
 arriving illegally or remaining in the
 United States after the expiration of
 their visas, and began the process of
 granting "extended voluntary departure"
 as a deportation-avoidance device.6
 These liberal admissions practices7
 were partly explicable on humanitarian
 grounds as well as on grounds of long-
 6. According to one source, "U.S. authorities
 have taken unusual steps to facilitate the entry of
 disaffected Cubans, even going so far as to allow
 the majority to enter without visas. No other
 potential exile group in the hemisphere has been
 so advantaged. If Castro's policies created the
 potential for mass exodus, U.S. policies made the
 exodus possible." R.F. Fagen, R. A. Brody, and T.
 J. O'Leary, Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the
 Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
 Press, 1968), p. 102.
 7. The ad hoc responses of consular and
 immigration officials were largely due to the lack
 of any formal refugee definition and special admis-
 sions bureaucracy applicable to arriving Cubans.
 Indicative of the government's undiscriminating
 approach to the Cuban migrants was the working
 definition of "Cuban refugee" employed by the
 Cuban Refugee Program when it became opera-
 tional in February 1961. Under that definition,
 any Cuban registered at the Cuban Refugee
 Emergency Center in Miami who left Cuba after 1
 January 1959, bearing proper identification from
 the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
 holding the status of parolee, permanent resident,
 or student, or granted indefinite voluntary depar-
 ture, was deemed a refugee. John F. Thomas,
 "Cuban Refugees in the United States," Interna-
 tional Migration Review, 1[2](1967); rpt. in Cortes,
 ed., Cuban Refugee Programs.
 established political ties and geographi-
 cal affinity. Executions and public trials
 of members of the old regime occurred
 soon after Castro assumed power.8 The
 earliest arrivals were Batistianos who
 had good cause to fear the same fate.
 They were soon followed by other Cu-
 bans not directly implicated in the former
 government. Self-imposed political exiles,
 they were clearly pushed out of Cuba,
 where they held positions of wealth,
 privilege, and power, rather than pulled
 to the difficult life that awaited them in
 Miami.9 A final group arriving in the
 first 28 months of Castro's rule were
 some of his disaffected followers, vete-
 rans of the Sierra Maestra campaign.
 Like the Batistianos, they had reason to
 fear for their personal safety. During
 this period there were relatively few res-
 traints against emigration, and commer-
 cial flights continued to operate out of
 Havana.
 However, the informality of the early
 U.S. response to the Cubans cannot be
 explained without taking into account
 the special perception of them shared by
 the Eisenhower and Kennedy adminis-
 8. Sources for the historical account that
 follows include, inter alia, Hugh Thomas, Cuba:
 The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper &
 Row, 1971); Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and
 the United States (Pittsburgh: University of
 Pittsburgh Press, 1971); John Barlow Martin,
 U.S. Policy in the Caribbean, A Twentieth Century
 Fund Essay (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978);
 Dominguez, From Neighbor to Stranger; Jorge I.
 Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cam-
 bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978);
 Lynn Darrell Bender, The Politics of Hostility
 (Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University
 Press, 1975); Lester A. Sobel, ed., Castro's
 Cuba in the 1970's (New York: Facts on File,
 1978); and New York Times Index, 1959-80.
 9. Fagen, Brody, and O'Leary, Cubans in
 Exile, p. 4.
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 tration. That perception regarded the
 Cuban flow as temporary, a view embo-
 died in the frequent use of the word
 "exile"10 to describe those fleeing from
 Castro's Cuba prior to late 1962 or early
 1963. From the very beginning, those
 settling in Florida were united by a
 common goal: to return to their home-
 land as quickly as possible. During
 1959, the Eisenhower administration
 restrained its hostility toward Castro.
 Nevertheless tensions between the two
 countries intensified. The United States
 reacted negatively to a wide range of
 events in Cuba, including the public
 trials and executions of several Ameri-
 cans; land reform and nationalization
 programs in Cuba that affected or threat-
 ened U.S. economic interests; fear of
 communist subversion in the Caribbean;
 and a developing political, economic,
 and military relationship between the
 Soviet Union and Cuba. Cuba was
 directly threatened by the U.S. decision
 to slash its sugar quota and by the
 repeated incursions of counterrevolu-
 tionaries flying into Cuba from sanctu-
 aries in southern Florida. Ever mindful
 of the overthrow of the leftward-leaning
 Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954
 and an extensive program of CIA covert
 activities throughout the Western Hem-
 isphere, Castro was spurred into anti-
 American hysteria in March 1960, when
 La Courbe, a French ship docked in
 Havana harbor, inexplicably exploded
 with considerable loss of life.
 The training of exiles for a possible
 future invasion of Cuba did not occur
 10. "Exile" and "Cuban refugee" have been
 used interchangeably from 1959 on. During the
 early 1960s, however, the former term predomi-
 nated in newspaper accounts and was frequently
 linked-as it has been consistently since-with
 attempts to overthrow the Castro regime.
 until 17 March 1960."1 However, such a
 use of the exile community was officially
 contemplated a full year earlier, when it
 was urged privately by then Vice-
 President Richard Nixon.12 By the
 autumn of 1959, the CIA was not only in
 contact with the exile community but
 had helped ferry Cubans from Cuba to
 Florida. Such ties may in fact date from
 March 1959 or earlier. Whatever the
 date, it is clear that President Kennedy
 inherited from President Eisenhower
 not only an invasion plan, but also two
 correlative beliefs: that Castro could be
 overthrown with the help of Cubans in
 the United Statesl3 and that once he was
 overthrown, these Cubans would-as
 they so often publicly proclaimed-
 return home. These beliefs did not neces-
 sarily entail enlisting large numbers of
 Cubans in the revolutionary brigade
 training in Guatemala; but they did tend
 to discourage federal policy that treated
 the exile phenomenon as potentially
 long-standing or permanent, particularly
 if such policy meant removing the exiles
 from their staging area for impending
 return, southern Florida.
 Thus on 7 December 1960, the first
 organized federal response to the Cuban
 influx emerged with the opening of the
 Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in
 Miami.14 In January 1961, President
 Kennedy established a successor Cuban
 11. Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom,
 p. 1271.
 12. Ibid., p. 1243.
 13. Kennedy apparently arrived at this view
 independently of the Eisenhower administration,
 since prior to learning of its CIA initiatives in
 Cuba, he had commenced urging the arming of
 exiles in the United States as part of his presiden-
 tial campaign.
 14. Report to the President of the United
 States on the Cuban Refugee Problem (Washing-
 ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1;
 rpt. in Cortes, ed., Cuban Refugee Programs.
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 Refugee Program designed to meet the
 same two fundamental objectives: pro-
 vision of welfare benefits to Cubans in
 need and resettlement of some of the
 thousands of Cubans already straining
 the resources of southern Florida to
 other parts of the United States. At the
 time that the Eisenhower program was
 established, it was recognized by the
 man who designed it, Tracy Voorhees,
 that resettlement might be the more dif-
 ficult process. Thus he reported to the
 president that Cubans in Florida were
 convinced that it would soon be possible
 to return to their homeland and would
 not willingly relocate in significant num-
 bers unless granted "assurance from an
 authoritative source... that they are not
 losing their chance to return home."'5
 Voorhees's concern proved to be jus-
 tified. As of the end of March 1961,
 13,122 Cubans out of an exile popula-
 tion of approximately 125,000 had reg-
 istered at the Cuban Refugee Center in
 Miami; only 2011 had been resettled.'6
 Kennedy's decision on 11 March "to let
 the Cubans go where they yearned to
 go-to Cuba'17 thus fulfilled a long-
 standing expectation of the exile com-
 munity and brought a series of political
 decisions affecting that community to a
 logical close. However, when the deci-
 sion was implemented on 17 April 1961,
 the Bay of Pigs invasion failed.
 15. Ibid., p. 10.
 16. Resettlement and registration figures are
 drawn from Thomas, "Cuban Refugees in the Uni-
 ted States," p. 14, Table 2. The flow estimate is a
 projection based on INS annual figures and esti-
 mated rates of flow.
 17. Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., A Thousand
 Days: Kennedy in the White House (Boston:
 Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 242.
 THE POLITICS OF ISOLATION
 AND FLIGHT: 1961-73
 The Bay of Pigs fiasco was a watershed
 event in the Kennedy administration
 and a key moment in the development of
 U.S. policy toward Cuba and toward
 the Cubans already in the United States
 or seeking to enter. Nevertheless the
 politics of exile, characterized by the
 expectations and the implicit promise of
 repatriation, did not die an immediate
 death. Instead repatriation became sud-
 denly a more distant prospect, and the
 United States was forced to regard the
 exile community as a fact that would not
 disappear overnight. One response might
 have been to close the border to Cuban
 entrants, most of whom were arriving
 on regularly scheduled airline flights at
 the rate of 1500-1700 per week. No con-
 sideration at all appears to have been
 given to this alternative. Instead Cuban
 migration continued at approximately
 the same rate until 22 October 1962,
 when in the aftermath of President
 Kennedy's Cuban missle crisis speech, it
 was unilaterally terminated by Castro.
 In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, it
 would have been politically suicidal and
 highly questionable morally to shut the
 door on potential Cuban entrants.
 The United States had planned,
 equipped, and then, through its half-
 hearted support, helped to botch an
 invasion that left over a hundred exiles
 dead and nearly 1200 in the hands of
 Castro's army. However critical the U.S.
 press was of the planning and execution
 of the Bay of Pigs, it was clear that there
 was widespread support for driving com-
 munism from the Western Hemisphere
 and general admiration for those aban-
 doned on the beaches of Cuba.'8 U.S.
 18. Typical of the press coverage of the time
 was an editorial in the Washington Post, 18 Apr.
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 perception of the exiles as victims and
 opponents of an ongoing historical pro-
 cess did not change after the Bay of Pigs;
 what changed was the perception of the
 strength of that process as it manifested
 itself in Cuba and the perception of the
 role that Cubans who had already fled-
 or might flee in the future-could realis-
 tically have in reversing it.
 These new perceptions and the shape
 of U.S. policy to come were signaled on
 20 April 1961 in President Kennedy's
 first public statement after the Bay of
 Pigs. Entitled "The Lesson of Cuba,"19 it
 made the following points. First, com-
 munism was firmly entrenched in Cuba
 and would not be easily overthrown.
 Second, the Cuban threat was part of a
 broader hemispheric and global cam-
 paign, which relied not only on military
 force, but also on the "legitimate dis-
 content of yearning peoples."20 Third,
 refugee flow reveals the bankruptcy of
 communism's promise:
 Those who shaped automatic "riots" in the
 streets of free nations over the efforts of a
 small group of young Cubans to regain their
 freedom should recall the long rollcall of
 refugees who cannot go back-to Hungary,
 to North Korea, to North Vietnam, to East
 Germany, or to Poland, or any of the other
 lands from which a steady stream of refugees
 pours forth, in eloquent testimony to the
 1960, p. 14. Entitled "Invasion of Cuba," it began,
 "Most Americans will make no secret of their
 sympathy with the efforts of Cubans to overthrow
 the Communist-dominated regime of Fidel Cas-
 tro." Later it asserts, "There is no law or treaty
 which precludes American help to those who are
 seeking to regain their freedom."
 19. Speech before the American Society of
 Newspaper Editors, 20 Apr. 1961, Department of
 State Bulletin, 44(1141):660 (8 May 1961).
 20. Ibid.
 cruel oppression now holding sway in their
 homelands. "21
 Fourth, in order to meet the threat of
 Castro's communism, the United States,
 together with other nations in Latin
 America, would have to assert its own
 will in "a struggle in many ways more
 difficult than war":
 If the self-discipline of the free cannot match
 the iron discipline of the mailed fist-in eco-
 nomic, political, scientific, and all the other
 kinds of struggles as well as the military-
 then the peril to freedom will continue to
 rise.22
 Kennedy's speech provided the blue-
 print for U.S.-Cuban relations for the
 next 13 years and gave a good indication
 of the role that Cuban refugees would
 play in the second stage of the struggle.
 Significantly, it did not renounce the use
 of force, although it precluded any "uni-
 lateral American intervention in the
 absence of an attack on ourselves or an
 ally."23 CIA intervention in Cuban affairs,
 either direct or through intermediaries,
 continued into the Nixon era,24 if not
 beyond. Included were several attempts
 to assassinate Castro commencing in
 late 1961, although not made public
 until 1975.25 Exiles continued to receive
 on-the-record financing with CIA funds
 21. Ibid.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Ibid., p. 659.
 24. In addition to the assassination attempts
 (note 2), it was alleged by former Defense Depart-
 ment consultant Lowell Ponte that in 1969-70, the
 CIA attempted to damage Cuba's sugar crop by
 means of a cloud-seeding program. New York
 Times, 27 June 1976, p. 7. In 1977, it was reported
 by Newsday that "anti-Castro terrorists had intro-
 duced African swine flu into Cuba in 1971 "with at
 least tacit CIA approval. Sobel, ed., Castro's Cuba
 in the 1970's, p. 131.
 25. See U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged
 Assassination Plots.
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 until May 1963, when it was announced
 that the annual stipend to the Cuban
 Revolutionary Council would be termi-
 nated.26 Circumstantial evidence suggests
 that radical anti-Castro Cubans con-
 tinued to receive secret U.S. government
 aid for at least another decade and that
 there were ties between U.S. intelligence
 agencies and the exile group that bombed
 a Cuban airline in 1976, killing 73
 people.27
 Nevertheless after the Bay of Pigs, the
 United States refused to support any
 large-scale military enterprise or recog-
 nize any Cuban government-in-exile,
 and the realization slowly grew that
 exile was likely to be a long, drawn-out
 state, perhaps even a permanent one.
 New legislation recommended by Presi-
 dent Kennedy on 21 July 1961 and
 enacted on 28 June 1962 authorized
 Cuban refugee aid on a permanent
 basis.28 In 1966, Congress acted to regu-
 larize and make permanent the immi-
 gration status of all of the Cubans who
 had arrived since 1 January 1959.29 The
 struggle, in other words, was not likely
 to be a new war of liberation, manned by
 exile invaders. Instead, as President
 Kennedy's 20 April 1961 speech inti-
 mated, it was going to be a longer cam-
 paign, waged simultaneously on diplo-
 matic, economic, and ideological fronts.
 Refugees would no longer be in the van-
 guard, yet they would continue to play a
 role.
 26. New York Times, 1 May 1963, p. 11. Also
 see New York Times, 17 Apr. 1963, p. 1.
 27. New York Times, 20 Oct. 1976, p. 3; New
 York Times, 22 Oct. 1976, p. 4; New York Times,
 24 Oct. 1976, sec. IV, p. 2; New York Times, 28
 Nov. 1976, p. 35; and Washington Post, 25 Oct.
 1976, sec. A, p. 26.
 28. Migration and Refugee Assisstance Act of
 1962, 76 Stat. 121.
 29. Act of 2 Nov. 1966, 80 Stat. 1161.
 The Kennedy administration under-
 stood, as perhaps did the Eisenhower
 administration before it, that political
 and economic assaults on the Castro
 regime could not be divorced from attacks
 on that regime's ideological appeal. Cas-
 tro's revolution promised a rapid trans-
 formation from a free market to a social-
 ist system and an end to the poverty that
 had always plagued the Latin American
 peasantry. U.S. policy toward Latin
 America, as enunciated in the aftermath
 of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile
 crisis, had two principal objectives: bring-
 ing about "within a democratic frame-
 work, the economic development and
 social reform necessary to provide a bet-
 ter way of life for millions of restless,
 underprrivileged people"30 and defend-
 ing and protecting "our democratic insti-
 tutions against the attempts of Castro
 communism to undermine and destroy
 them."31
 The Alliance for Progress, a massive
 hemispheric aid program launched by
 President Kennedy during his first days
 in office, was intended to serve as the
 primary vehicle for the first objective. A
 campaign to extend U.S. diplomatic
 and commercial sanctions against Cuba
 to every nation in the hemisphere, and
 to Cuba's traditional trading partners in
 Europe, was intended to serve as the
 primary vehicle for the second.
 Under Secretary of State George Ball
 labeled this campaign a "systematic pro-
 gram of economic denial" in a speech
 30. Edwin A. Martin, Assistant Secretary of
 State for Inter-American Affairs, "Interdepend-
 ence and the Principles of Self-Determination"
 (Address before the Pan-American Society of the
 United States, 16 Apr. 1963), Department of State
 Bulletin, 48(1245):711 (6 May 1963).
 31. Ibid.
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 delivered in April 1964.32 In that speech,
 Ball noted that this program was intended
 as the substantive complement to an
 ongoing "propaganda campaign. 33 Sum-
 marizing its objectives, Ball indicated
 that a "program of economic denial
 [was not] likely by itself to bring down
 the present Cuban regime."34 Instead it
 could accomplish other, more limited
 purposes:
 First, to reduce the will and ability of the
 present Cuban regime to export subversion
 and violence to other American states;
 Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba
 and to elements of the power structure of the
 regime that the present regime cannot serve
 their interests;
 Third, to demonstrate to the people of the
 American republics that communism has no
 future in the Western Hemisphere; and
 Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet
 Union of maintaining a Communist outpost
 in the Western Hemisphere."35
 U.S. policy toward Cuba from the
 beginning of 1962 through 1974 was large-
 ly devoted to spreading and defending
 the gospel of economic denial. Through-
 out the period, and particularly during
 the airlift years, 1965-73, Cuban refu-
 gees were used both as acolytes of that
 gospel and as instruments of that policy.
 The boycott of Cuba was probably
 the most intensive campaign of com-
 mercial isolation ever waged by one
 nation, and its allies, against another.
 Overt U.S. actions included maintain-
 32. George Ball, "Principles of Our Policy
 toward Cuba" (Speech before a Convention of the
 Omicron Delta Kappa Society, 23 Apr. 1964),





 ing an embargo on trade with Cuba and
 placing severe restrictions on travel to
 and from Cuba by persons using U.S.
 passports. In January 1962, the foreign
 ministers of the Organization of Ameri-
 can States (OAS) voted to exclude Cuba
 from participation in the OAS system.
 In 1963, President Kennedy pledged to
 build a "wall" around Cuba,36 and mea-
 sures were taken to pressure the major
 industrial nations to cut all trade with
 Cuba.
 Finally in July 1964, after years of
 U.S. pressure and the overthrow of a
 government sympathetic to the Castro
 regime in Brazil, and over the objections
 of Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico,
 the OAS imposed comprehensive dip-
 lomatic and trade sanctions. These sanc-
 tions included the breaking of diplo-
 matic and consular relations with Cuba,
 the suspension of all trade except in
 foodstuffs and medicine, and the sus-
 pension of sea transportation between
 Cuba and other American states except
 that employed for humanitarian reasons.
 Cuba was thus isolated almost entirely
 from other countries in this hemisphere,
 and although not cut off entirely from
 other Western trade, it had its access to
 shipping, air transportation, and markets
 dramatically reduced. The results, when
 combined with a dramatic decline in the
 world market price of sugar, were pre-
 dictable. The Cuban economy, which
 had remained on a fairly even keel
 through 1962, plunged in 1963 and 1964
 into a trough from which it was not to
 emerge for nearly a decade. Between
 1962 and February 1965, Cuba's trade
 via free world ships declined nearly 60
 36. "President Urges Wall of Liberty Encir-
 cling Cuba" (Speech before Central American
 President's Conference, 18 Mar. 1963), New York
 Times, 19 Mar. 1963, p. 1.
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 percent.37 Not surprisingly, Castro turned
 increasingly to the Eastern bloc for trade
 and aid, and Cuba became increasingly
 dependent on its socialist allies.
 While the poorest members of Cuban
 society benefited from the vast expan-
 sion of schooling and medical programs,
 the material and political position of the
 remaining Cuban middle class deterio-
 rated rapidly. According to the account
 of one State Department official in
 1964, for "the first time in their history,
 the 'Cuban people must queue up to
 receive meager rations of food and cloth-
 ing."'38 It was hardly surprising, there-
 fore, that considerable sentiment to leave
 Cuba, particularly among the middle
 class, developed in 1964 and 1965-
 sentiment that led directly to Castro's
 public statements on 28 and 30 Sep-
 tember 1965 that all who desired to leave
 Cuba were free to do so; to President
 Johnson's welcoming response at the
 Statue of Liberty on 3 October;39 and to
 the negotiations leading to the com-
 mencement of more than seven years of
 freedom flights on 1 December 1965,
 after a short-lived boatlift from Cama-
 rioca harbor engineered by Castro with
 the cooperation of the exile community
 in the United States.
 Thus there can be no doubt that a
 systematic and rigorously pursued U.S.
 37. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, OAS Rep-
 resentative, Address to the Council of the Organi-
 zation of American States, 27 Feb. 1965, Depart-
 ment of State Bulletin, 52(1344):465 (29 Mar.
 1965).
 38. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary for
 Inter-American Affairs, "The Western Hemi-
 sphere's Fight for Freedom," Department of State
 Bulletin, 51(1321):550 (19 Oct. 1964).
 39. "Remarks at the Signing of the Immigra-
 tion Bill," 3 Oct. 1965, in Public Papers of the
 Presidents: Lyndon Johnson, 1965 (Washington,
 DC: Government Printing Office, 1966-68), Vol.
 2, pp. 1039-40.
 policy contributed greatly to the decline
 of the Cuban economy in the middle
 1960s, and that the first significant migra-
 ation from Cuba since 1962 was one
 major result. Virginia Dominguez, in
 congressional testimony, labeled the post-
 1965 Cuban arrivals "consumer refu-
 gees," explaining that they were
 people who left Cuba largely because they
 were used to a standard of living they could
 no longer have in Cuba. Many consumer
 goods were not easily available after the
 revolution. Many of those who came after
 1965 were housewives and children, and
 were not actively political. They were not
 necessarily poor, or the victims of political
 persecution. The people who really do qual-
 ify as political refugees... are those who left
 within the first two years after the revolution
 and not those thereafter.40
 Undoubtedly this generalization ignores
 some individual Cubans who left Cuba
 between 1965 and 1973 for explicitly
 political reasons. Nonetheless it is note-
 worthy that the eligible pool for the
 freedom flights excluded all political
 prisoners, and all draft-age men, who
 might have sought refuge as conscien-
 tious objectors.41 Instead the Memo-
 randum of Understanding between Cuba
 and the United States, in the words of
 one State Department official, "was
 40. Testimony of Virginia Dominguez, House
 Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigra-
 tion, Refugees, and International Law, 24 May
 1979, Committee Report, Hearings on the Refu-
 gee Act of 1979, House Report 2816 (Washington,
 DC: Government Printing Office, 1979).
 41. "Memorandum of Understanding Con-
 cerning the Movement to the United States of
 Cubans Wishing to Live in the United States,"
 "Third Separate Note on Political Prisoners," 6
 Nov. 1965; rpt. in House Committee on Foreign
 Affairs, Hearings: Cuba and the Caribbean (Wash-
 ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970),
 pp. 5-9.
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 designed essentially to reunite families
 in the United States."42
 Although U. S. officials often took
 partial credit for the growing hardship
 in Cuba, such claims were always tem-
 pered by assertions, similar to the one
 made by Under Secretary of State George
 Ball in 1964, that
 Cuba is providing a spectacle of economic
 failure for all to see. Far from offering a
 better life for the Cuban people, Commu-
 nism is bringing only depression and want.43
 The imperatives of this ideological logic
 required that those fleeing such depres-
 sion and want be labeled refugees, their
 departure treated as a ballot for free-
 dom.44 Further, it was believed or at
 least argued as late as 1970 that a gener-
 ous U.S. refugee immigration policy
 might encourage continued resistance to
 communism in Cuba. Thus defending
 the continuation of the freedom flights
 that had begun in December 1965, Robert
 Hurwitch, deputy assistant secretary of
 state for Inter-American Affairs, testi-
 fied in July 1970,
 In addition to the humanitarian considera-
 tions involved and the fact that we have
 entered into an international agreement,
 there is additional sound basis for the airlift.
 Experience has indicated that as long as
 hope for escape to freedom exists, people
 living under oppression resist committing
 themselves to the regime's goals; but when
 42. Statement of Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy
 Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
 Affairs, 8 July 1970; rpt. in ibid., p. 41.
 43. Ball, "Principles of Our Policy," p. 743.
 44. For an excellent treatment of the symbolic
 function of political migrations to the United
 States, see Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, "Cubans and
 Mexicans in the United States: The Functions of
 Political and Economic Migration," Cuban Stu-
 dies/Estudios Cubanos, 11(2)/12(1):79-97 (July
 1981-Jan. 1982).
 escape routes are sealed, accommodation to
 the inevitable becomes the prevailing atti-
 tude. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the
 case of East Germany where the beginning of
 economic recovery can be said to date from
 the erection of the Berlin wall: when the wall
 barred future escape to the freedom of the
 West, the East German population had no
 real alternative but to accommodate to the
 Communist regime there. The refugee airlift,
 a route to freedom, forestalls the certainty of
 accommodation to communism by the Cuban
 people.45
 In sum, it was an article of faith that the
 ultimate repudiation of communism was
 the spectacle of people "voting with
 their feet." That type of vote, U.N.
 Ambassador Arthur Goldberg argued
 in 1965, is a "criterion of how people
 really feel":46
 Many thousands of Cubans have seized
 every available means of transportation which
 will take them from Cuba to the United
 States, but no crowds are pounding on
 Cuba's gates and seeking admission.47
 Had Ambassador Goldberg con-
 tinued, he might have noted that the
 unidirectional flow from Cuba was per-
 ceived by policymakers in the United
 States as having an instrumental as well
 as a symbolic effect. As U.S. resistance
 to a U.N. decision to grant Cuba agri-
 cultural development funds illustrated,
 economic denial was linked to an attempt
 to deprive Cuba of technical expertise.48
 45. Hurwitch, Statement, p. 5.
 46. Arthur Goldberg, Statement before the
 General Assembly, 21 Dec. 1965, Department of
 State Bulletin, 50(1387):128 (24 Jan. 1966).
 47. Ibid., pp. 128-29.
 48. At issue was a $1 million appropriation by
 the U.N. Special Fund and the Food and Agricul-
 ture Organization for an agricultural research
 station in Cuba. The United States objected con-
 tinually to the grant of such technical assistance
 from 1961 through the spring of 1963. See Secre-
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 Increasingly in the late 1960s and early
 1970s, Castro complained of the nega-
 tive effect on the Cuban economy
 wrought by the departure of so many
 well-educated and skilled people to the
 United States. Cuban unwillingness to
 let the freedom flights continue indefi-
 nitely was undoubtedly influenced by
 this brain drain.49 However, in ways
 apparently not foreseen by anyone in
 the Department of State, some signifi-
 cant benefits accrued to the Castro
 regime from the outflow. Thus potential
 dissidents were exported in large num-
 bers, their property redistributed, and
 the socialization of the Cuban economy
 hastened. It is thus not clear that the
 1965-73 migration was of more lasting
 benefit to the United States than it was
 to the Cuban government. But the con-
 temporary view, expressed frequently
 by politicians and State Department
 officials, was that the freedom flights
 furthered U.S. foreign policy objectives.
 THE POLITICS OF
 THWARTED NORMALIZATION:
 1974-80
 Between the end of the freedom flights
 in April 1973 and the beginning of the
 1980 Mariel boatlift, a seven-year period
 intervened during which Cuban migra-
 tion to the United States was limited to a
 few thousand Cuban political prisoners,
 Cuban spouses and children accompan-
 ying Americans who had been previously
 denied exit visas, approximately 17,000
 tary of State Rusk, "U.S. Position on Special
 Food Project in Cuba," 13 Feb. 1963, State
 Department Bulletin, 48(1237):357 (11 Mar. 1963).
 49. For more than a year before the end of the
 freedom flights, it had been reported that Cuba
 might end them because of the economic effect of
 losing its professional class. See New York Times,
 6 Dec. 1971, p. 25.
 migrants rejoining family members from
 Spain, and the occasional boat person.
 Despite its initial characterization as a
 freedom flotilla by the press50 and the
 initial warm welcome extended to its
 members by the Carter administration,
 the 1980 influx aroused unprecedented
 opposition within weeks of its inception
 and resulted within months in a total
 reversal of two decades of unquestion-
 ing welcome of anti-Castro Cubans.
 One reason for this reversal was the
 backlash generated by the sudden and
 disorderly arrival on the beaches of
 Florida of 125,000 people, a significant
 percentage of whom proved difficult to
 resettle. Concerns about the criminal
 element within the Mariel cohort cer-
 tainly played a major role, as did the
 well-publicized rioting at resettlement
 camps in Arkansas and Wisconsin.
 By 1980, moreover, the implicit ra-
 tionale for regarding every Cuban mi-
 grant as a refugee had largely evaporated.
 Responsible for that evaporation was
 not only the immediate sense that Mariel
 was a direct result of Castro's hostility
 toward the United States, but also a
 long-germinating realization that the
 Cubans who arrived here could no longer
 be used to make any further exemplary
 points about either the horrors of life
 under Castro or the more general fail-
 ures of the communist system. That real-
 ization had its roots in a gradual redefi-
 nition of U.S.-Cuban relations that began
 while the freedom flights were still under
 way. The failure of this redefinition of
 50. Typical of early coverage was a story
 describing asylum-seeking Cubans in their "voyage
 to freedom," "Sea Lift from Cuba to Key West,"
 Newsweek, 5 May 1980, p. 59. Two weeks later,
 the press was emphasizing "the rapidly growing
 backlash." "The Cuban Tide Is a Flood," News-
 week, 19 May 1980, p. 29.
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 relations to achieve long-awaited nor-
 malization was probably the chief factor
 in Castro's unleashing of the Mariel
 flow.
 By the early 1970s, there was concern
 growing in Congress that Cuban migra-
 tion had lost its original political charac-
 ter, that it was bringing to the United
 States larger numbers of people less eas-
 ily assimilable to the domestic labor
 market and more dependent on welfare
 aid, and that the money spent on the
 airlift and related resettlement programs
 might better be spent on the indigenous
 poor.5' Although the Department of
 State continued to insist that the free-
 dom flights were a demonstration of the
 bankruptcy of the Cuban system, the
 ideological argument for admitting Cu-
 bans as refugees had lost some of its
 force. That argument continued to de-
 cline in importance as, in succeeding
 years, initiatives and attitudinal changes
 toward Cuba and the communist bloc
 that first emerged in the late 1960s con-
 tinued to develop.
 Among these developments were the
 evolution of more pragmatic and less
 ideological ways of managing the East-
 West conflict; a new perception of Cuba
 as a nuisance rather than as an overt
 threat to hemispheric peace; a growing
 realization that the policy of economi-
 cally and politically isolating Cuba was
 no longer a practical option, given the
 unwillingness of traditional allies to
 continue to cooperate; and a concomi-
 tant understanding that past policy had
 in any event failed, creating hardship in
 51. In June 1971, the Appropriations Com-
 mittee of the U.S. Senate voted to cut off funds for
 the airlift because it believed the continuing influx
 was adding to U.S. welfare rolls. New York Times,
 26 June 1971, p. 26. Similar attempts to cut off
 airlift funds to aid U.S. urban poor occurred in
 1970. See New York Times, 10 July 1970, p. 4.
 Cuba and pushing it ever more deeply
 into the Eastern bloc, yet producing no
 significant liberalization in Cuba and no
 counterrevolutionary movement there.
 DETENTE
 The retreat from unrelieved hostility
 in U.S.-Cuban relations took place within
 the context of the Nixon-Kissinger at-
 tempt to reach a more constructive rela-
 tionship with the Soviet Union and
 China, America's two principal adver-
 saries. Instead of superpower relations
 based on total enmity, the Nixon admin-
 istration sought to involve Russia and
 China in the establishment of a new
 power balance that would reduce ten-
 sion and the risks of war.52 Kissinger
 wanted to avoid the ideological moral-
 ism that had characterized American
 foreign policy during the cold war.53 He
 avoided criticisms of internal Soviet or
 Chinese policy, believing that such
 demands were likely to be counterpro-
 ductive and would threaten detente,
 jeopardize the delicate balance of arms
 control negotiations, and reintroduce
 the cold war.
 This new approach to East-West rela-
 tions at least indirectly affected Cuban-
 American relations. For if the IJnited
 States was prepared to negotiate its dif-
 ferences with the Soviet Union and to
 52. Henry Kissinger, "The Process of Detente"
 (Statement delivered to the Senate Foreign Rela-
 tions Committee, 19 Sept. 1974), in his American
 Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 1977),
 pp. 144-45.
 53. See Interview with Pierre Salinger, L'Ex-
 press, News Release, 12 Apr. 1975, Bureau of Public
 Affairs, Office of Media Services, Department
 of State; and Henry Kissinger, "Moral Purposes
 and Policy Choices," Department of State Bulletin,
 69: 525 (1973).
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 pursue the possibility of trade and diplo-
 matic relations with China, which it had
 traditionally labeled as perhaps the most
 totalitarian regime in the world and as a
 direct military threat to its allies and
 strategic interests, the rationale for con-
 tinuing to isolate Cuba largely evapo-
 rated. As Secretary of State William
 Rogers noted in an address before the
 General Assembly of the OAS three
 months after the China visit, "the very
 boldness of President Nixon's initiatives
 toward China has raised questions whe-
 ther we might not be on the verge of a
 shift, with similar surprise, in our atti-
 tude toward Cuba."54
 REDUCED CUBAN THREAT
 Further contributing to the dissipa-
 tion of that rationale was a subtle rechar-
 acterization of the Castro regime which
 began in 1967, when Ernesto Che Gue-
 vara was killed in Bolivia and his guer-
 rilla movement there wiped out. As
 early as 1968, Sol Linowitz, President
 Johnson's adviser on Latin American
 affairs, had reported that there was no
 massive guerrilla threat to hemispheric
 security.55 At that time, the Soviet Union
 was also applying considerable pressure
 on the Castro regime to abandon its
 attempts to export revolution. As a
 result, there occurred a fundamental
 shift in Cuban foreign policy.56 Although
 Castro did not renounce his ideas on
 revolution, he began to stress the need
 for internal development and peaceful
 relations with progressive governments.
 54. William Rogers, Statement of 12 Apr.
 1972, Department of State Bulletin, 66(1714): 621
 (1 May, 1972).
 55. New York Times, 28 Feb. 1968, p. 10.
 56. Jorge Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Pol-
 icy," Foreign Affairs, 57(1):83-108 (Fall 1978),
 esp. pp. 59-91.
 Cuban relations with other nations in
 Latin America became more concilia-
 tory. By 1970, the only condition being
 stressed by the Cuban government for
 relations with Cuba-that countries
 behave independently of the U.S. hemi-
 spheric security-grew increasingly uncon-
 vincing as a reason for isolating Cuba.
 THE FAILURE OF ISOLATION
 Cuba's new foreign policy contrib-
 uted to the failure of a U.S.-dominated
 strategy of isolation by reopening diplo-
 matic and trade channels to other coun-
 tries in the hemisphere and by providing
 additional encouragement to Western
 European nations to resume or augment
 their commerce with Cuba. By the early
 1970s, Cuba had greatly expanded its
 international contacts. Favorable govern-
 ments had come to power in Chile,
 Argentina, Peru, and Panama and were
 willing to join Mexico in renouncing
 sanctions. Other Latin American nations,
 such as Venezuela and Ecuador, were
 anxious to increase trade with Cuba.
 Newly independent English-speaking
 countries in the Caribbean that were
 admitted to the OAS had had no part in
 the blockade of Cuba and maintained
 friendly relations. A new trade accord
 was also reached with Mexico, and
 commerce with Japan, Canada, and the
 Western European countries rose dra-
 matically.
 PRESSURE FOR A
 NEW CUBAN POLICY
 Responding to these developments,
 Congress and various interest groups
 within and without the United States
 began urging a new U.S. policy toward
 Cuba well in advance of the termination
 of the freedom flights in 1973. As early
 as the 1968 presidential campaign,
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 Hubert Humphrey had suggested that
 the OAS reexamine its sanctions.57 In
 1969, Senator Mansfield, an early advo-
 cate of the U.S. boycott, spoke in favor
 of entering into a hijacking treaty with
 Cuba, and of improving U.S.-Cuban
 relations.58 Similar positions were adop-
 ted by other members of the Senate For-
 eign Relations Committee. Similarly the
 New York Times in 1971 adopted a new
 editorial policy urging normalization,59
 and a number of mainline church groups,
 including the Roman Catholic Bishops
 of Cuba, the United Presbyterian Church,
 and the World Council of Churches,
 advocated the end of Cuba's "continen-
 tal excommunication."60 There were also
 indications from various members of
 the U.S. business community that they
 would welcome steps toward resump-
 tion of commercial relations.
 Thus a full-fledged debate on U.S.
 policy toward Cuba was already under
 way in the early 1970s when Senate hear-
 ings were held reviewing that policy.
 That debate continued through the 1972
 presidential campaign, with the Nixon
 administration remaining quite adament
 about Cuba, although permitting such
 small accommodations as the journey of
 57. Hubert Humphrey, Interview with editors
 of the New York Times, New York Times 23 June
 1968, p. 58. However, by October 1968, Vice-President
 Humphrey was taking a considerably harder line.
 See New York Times, 20 Oct. 1968, p. 74.
 58. See New York Times, 2 Feb. 1969, p. 48;
 and New York Times, 9 Dec. 1969, p. 4.
 59. In October 1971, the New York Times
 advocated for the first time that the United States
 normalize its relations with Cuba. New York
 Times, 29 Oct. 1971, p. 40.
 60. Archbishop Camara, speaking on behalf
 of the Roman Catholic Bishops of Cuba, New
 York Times, 27 Jan. 1969, p. 2. Pronormalization
 statements issued by the other named groups were
 reported by the New York Times, 25 May 1969, p.
 40, and 21 Aug. 1969, p. 7.
 a U.S. volleyball team to Cuba in 1971
 and the initiation-immediately after
 the 1972 election-of skyjacking talks
 with Cuba. The Cuban plank of the 1972
 Democratic platform was considerably
 more moderate, stating that the "time
 has come to reexamine our relations
 with Cuba and to seek a way to resolve
 this cold war confrontation on mutually
 acceptable terms."61 The quest for such
 "mutually acceptable terms" began soon
 after President Ford entered office in
 1974 and continued under President
 Carter until early 1978, although new
 U.S.-Cuban tensions erupted in late
 1977.
 NORMALIZATION, MIGRATION,
 AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 Implicit in U.S. responses to Cuban
 migration prior to the era of attempted
 normalization of relations was a view of
 human rights similar to that espoused
 later and more explicitly by Ernest
 Lefever and Jeane Kirkpatrick.62 Thus
 61. Sobel, ed. Castro's Cuba in the 1970's, p.
 46.
 62. In an op-ed piece commenting on the
 emerging Carter position, "The Rights Standard,"
 LeFever argued that human rights policy should
 be subordinate to the national interest more
 broadly defined. He asserted it was in the national
 interest to continue supporting an "authoritarian
 ally," Chile, but not to improve relations with a
 "totalitarian adversary," Cuba, which maintained
 a military presence in Africa and held "thousands
 of political prisoners and denied many basic
 rights." New York Times, 24 Jan. 1977, p. 23.
 Jeane Kirkpatrick has elaborated on the authori-
 tarian/ totalitarian distinction. See "Human Rights
 and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium,"
 Commentary, Nov. 1981, pp. 42-45. In June 1982,
 Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state for
 Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in a
 speech delivered in Miami, relied implicitly on the
 authoritarian/totalitarian distinction to explain
 why Cubans are refugees and should continue to
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 life in Cuba was regarded automatically
 as the equivalent of persecution, and
 those fleeing as refugees.63 During the
 era of attempted normalization, consid-
 erably less attention was given to the
 hardships of life in Cuba. Particularly
 during President Ford's administration,
 when migration from Cuba was almost
 nonexistent, little attempt was made to
 relate current conditions there to the
 generation of refugee flow.
 This is not to suggest that either Pres-
 ident Ford or his State Department said
 many positive things about the Castro
 regime. Rather the policy, at least through
 late 1975, was to say very little publicly
 while conducting secretive but not
 entirely unnoticed normalization nego-
 tiations. This was consistent with Secre-
 tary of State Kissinger's view that rela-
 tions with foreign governments, and not
 the internal affairs of foreign countries,
 were the legitimate concern of the U.S.
 government. The changes that were tak-
 ing place in Cuba's relations with other
 governments and the generally changing
 pattern of world politics led to an Amer-
 be welcome in the United States-at least to the
 extent they are not "shot" at the United States "in
 the way a cannonball is shot out of a cannon,"
 while Haitians should be turned away at the
 border or interdicted at sea. "Human Rights and
 the Refugee Crisis," 2 June 1982, Department of
 State Bulletin, 82(2066):43-45, 44 (Sept. 1982).
 63. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration
 and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 essentially
 defined a refugee as a person fleeing persecution in
 a communist-dominated or Middle Eastern coun-
 try. INA, sec. 203(a) (7), 8 USC 1153(a) (7) (1965)
 (repealed). Most Cubans were not admitted under
 the direct authority of these amendments, although
 they did receive favorable immigration treatment.
 To the best of the authors' knowledge, almost
 without exception, Cubans prior to the summer of
 1980 were not required by the Immigration Ser-
 vice to show any personal opposition to the Castro
 regime or any personal hardship exacted as a price
 for particular associations or political beliefs.
 ican reappraisal of relations with Cuba
 and a search for possible areas of accom-
 modation.
 During this period, minor steps were
 taken to lessen hostilities. In February
 1973, the governments of the United
 States and Cuba signed an antihijacking
 agreement. An important provision of
 the agreement stipulated that each coun-
 try would try to punish, according to its
 law, persons who conspired to promote,
 prepare, direct, or participate in any
 expedition aimed at damaging aircraft
 or vessels traveling to or from the terri-
 tory of the other country or other sim-
 ilar unlawful acts.64 In a major policy
 shift, the United States voted with the
 new majority which, in July 1975, ended
 the OAS policy of hemispheric sanc-
 tions. President Ford, Secretary of State
 Kissinger, and a number of other State
 Department officials all made public
 statements favoring dialogue with Cuba
 with the object of eventually normaliz-
 ing relations.
 However, two aspects of Cuban for-
 eign policy were consistently criticized:
 its growing military involvement in
 Angola and its support in the U.N.
 Decolonization Committee for Puerto
 Rican independence. Moreover Secre-
 tary Kissinger, in a comment in connec-
 tion with the lifting of the OAS embargo
 on Cuba, had specified that the U.S.
 decision on whether to resume relations
 with Cuba would be "heavily influenced
 by the external policies of the Cuban
 government," especially in connection
 64. Agreement on the Hijacking of Aircraft
 and Vessels and Other Offenses (15 Feb. 1973),
 TIAS 7575, UNTS, 24:737. This was the first
 agreement to limit the use of the United States as a
 base for terrorist exile groups against Cuba and
 received virtually no publicity in the United States.
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 with its "military relationship with coun-
 tries outside the hemisphere."65
 Increasing concern over Cuba's Afri-
 can role, as well as the exigencies of the
 primary campaign for the 1976 presi-
 dential race, resulted in an abrupt U.S.
 policy shift in late 1975 and early 1976.
 In November 1975, shortly after Castro
 sent 4000 Cuban troops to aid the forces
 of the Popular Movement for the Liber-
 ation of Angola, negotiations between
 Cuban and U.S. diplomats broke off; in
 December, President Ford announced
 that the "action of the Cuban govern-
 ment in sending combat forces into
 Angola destroys any opportunity for
 improvement of relations with Cuba. "66
 In February of the following year-
 five days before the Florida primary-
 the president assumed his most forceful
 anti-Castro stance. In that speech, de-
 livered at a ceremony in Miami in which
 some 1200 immigrants, including a large
 number of Cubans, became naturalized
 American citizens, he not only labeled
 the Castro regime "a regime of aggres-
 sion"67 and pledged total U.S. noncoop-
 eration with it, but also resorted for per-
 haps the only time in his administration
 to the traditional cold war refugee rhe-
 toric with respect to Cubans. Thus he
 told his audience,
 You can tell those who take America for
 granted that millions of people in other lands
 as far away as 9,000 miles and as close as 90
 65. Quoted in Jan Knippers Black et al., Area
 Handbook for Cuba (Washington, DC: Govern-
 ment Printing Office, 1976), p. 345.
 66. "President's News Conference of December
 20, 1975," in Public Papers of the Presidents:
 Gerald Ford, 1975 (Washington, DC: Govern-
 ment Printing Office), vol. 2, p. 1987.
 67. Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald
 Ford, 1976 (Washington, DC: Government Print-
 ing Office), vol. 1, p. 464.
 miles would dearly love to have just a frac-
 tion of freedom we have in America.
 Many of you come from places where people
 are denied the right of free choice; from pla-
 ces where churches and synagogues are open,
 but only for tourists; from places where free
 elections are promised, but never held; from
 places where free speech exists only as a
 memory.68
 In the same speech, President Ford also
 pledged to support legislation speeding
 the naturalization of Cuban refugees.
 The more overt normalization drive
 that occurred when Jimmy Carter became
 president in January 1977 followed much
 the same pattern, with numerous public
 statements supporting eventual resump-
 tion of diplomatic relations, criticism of
 the Castro regime focused generally on
 its foreign rather than its domestic pol-
 icy, and no recourse, even indirectly, to
 the metaphor of people voting with their
 feet until late in the president's term,
 when the campaign for renomination
 and reelection was already under way.
 Nonetheless the Carter administration,
 because of its more specific emphasis on
 human rights and because of some of the
 advances it did make in improving rela-
 tions with Cuba, developed a more
 comprehensive immigration policy
 toward Cuba than did its predecessors,
 although that policy was hardly free
 from contradiction.
 The step-by-step advances in Cuban-
 American relations in 1977 and the sub-
 sequent retreat in 1978 and 1979 have
 been sufficiently well documented else-
 where.69 However, several lines of devel-
 68. Ibid.
 69. Among the better. accounts of Cuban-
 American relations 1977-80 are Alfred Stepan,
 "The United States and Latin America: Vital
 Interests and the Instruments of Power," Foreign
 Affairs, America and the World-1979, 58(3):659-
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 opment that directly affected the flow of
 Cubans to the United States from the
 autumn of 1978 on and that helped color
 the official and unofficial perception of
 the Mariel boatlift deserve some atten-
 tion. These developments involved the
 partial but short-lived opening of ordi-
 nary migration channels, the reversal of
 the political prisoner issue, the instru-
 mental role that contacts between Cuban
 exiles and the Castro regime played in
 renewing Cuban migration, the political
 use that Castro was able to make of the
 boatlift, and the Carter administration's
 own indecisiveness about how to char-
 acterize or treat the Cubans seeking
 admission.
 All of these factors were closely re-
 lated. The culmination of the 1977 Cuban
 thaw was the opening, on 1 September
 of that year, of interest sections by the
 United States and Cuba in Havana and
 Washington, respectively. Staffed by
 mid-level diplomats, they provided a
 channel for continuing direct bilateral
 92, 685-91; William M. LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy
 Recycled," Foreign Policy, 46:105-19 (Spring 1982);
 and Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic
 Policy," Foreign Policy, 48:157-74 (Fall 1982).
 Also informative are Barry Sklar, Cuban Exodus-
 1980, the Context, mimeo (Washington, DC:
 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Ser-
 vice, 1980); and the report of the Special Congres-
 sional Study Mission to Cuba, Toward Improved
 U.S.-Cuba Relations (Washington, DC: Govern-
 ment Printing Office, 1977), which contains an
 especially helpful chronology as an appendix. For
 treatment of events leading up to the Mariel boat-
 lift, see Mario A. Rivera, "The Cuban and Haitian
 Influxes of 1980 and the American Response: Ret-
 rospect and Prospect," U.S. House of Representa-
 tives Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight Hear-
 ings: Caribbean Migration (Washington, DC:
 Government Printing Office, 1980), appendix 4;
 and Ronald Copeland, "The Cuban Boatlift of
 1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis Management,"
 The Annals of the American Academy of Political
 and Social Science, 467 (May 1983).
 contact. As important, they had a limited
 capacity to issue travel documents and
 visas. Movement in both directions was
 thus facilitated. The opening of the
 interest section in Washington, the lapse
 of a regulation prohibiting the travel of
 U.S. citizens to Cuba, and the U.S.
 Treasury's legalization of expenditures
 in Cuba by visitors from the United
 States set the stage for short-term visits
 to Cuba by Cuban exiles and others.
 These were made initially by members
 of the Cuban community in Miami who
 favored dialogue with Castro. However,
 in November 1978-at a time when
 U.S.-Cuban relations had soured again,
 due to widespread Cuban military involve-
 ment in Africa-Castro announced that
 beginning in January 1979, he would
 accept visits from all Cuban exiles.70
 During 1979, some 100,000 Cuban
 Americans accepted this invitation.
 It is important to note that these trips
 to Cuba began well before there was any
 significant flow in the opposite direc-
 tion. When renewed Cuban migration
 to the United States began, first as the
 result of a Castro-initiated political pri-
 soner release program and later as a
 consequence of the Peruvian embassy
 occupation and the subsequent Mariel
 boatlift, much of its impetus could be
 traced back to the visits to Cuba by
 exiles. Similarly much of the Carter
 administration's ambivalence toward
 that flow when it began can be traced to
 its uncertainty about the exile role, both
 at the time of these visits and afterward.
 The political prisoner release pro-
 gram and the Carter administration's
 response to it in large measure set the
 tone for the administration's later
 response to Mariel. At the 1976 nomi-
 70. New York Times, 22 Nov. 1978, p. 2.
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 nating convention, the Democrats tied
 betterment of U.S.-Cuban relations to
 two issues: lessening of Cuban involve-
 ment in Africa and release of political
 prisoners in Cuba.71 In response to fre-
 quent questions after his election about
 his human rights policy vis-a-vis Cuba,
 President Carter's stock response was
 that the United States was seeking, as a
 condition or prerequisite for normaliza-
 tion, "a demonstration of [the Cuban
 leadersl commitment to the human rights
 concept, particularly by releasing some
 of the thousands of political prisoners
 they have had incarcerated for a number
 of years, 15 or 20 years.t72 Although the
 political prisoner question was the only
 specific human rights issue President
 Carter was to raise publicly about Cuba
 until the last year of his term, he received
 no positive response from Castro during
 the 1977 thaw.
 However, on 1 September 1978, three
 months after Carter had lashed out at
 Cuba for its alleged involvement in the
 Angolan invasion of Zaire, Castro an-
 nounced a change of heart: he would
 release 500-1000 political prisoners into
 the custody of the United States. In
 October, Castro met with a visiting
 delegation of exiles, the Committee of
 75. Following that meeting, Castro an-
 nounced that he agreed with the com-
 mittee in principle that more political
 prisoners should be released, that there
 should be more family reunification and
 more travel to Cuba.73 Finally in Novem-
 71. Sobel, ed., Castro's Cuba in the 1970's, p.
 159.
 72. Interview with the President, and Ques-
 tion and Answer Session with a group of Publish-
 ers, Editors, and Broadcasters, 20 May 1977, in
 Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter,
 1977 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
 Office), vol. 1, p. 946.
 73. New York Times, 24 Oct. 1978, p. 13.
 ber, in the same speech that initiated the
 large-scale visitation program, Castro
 announced his intention of releasing
 some 3000 political prisoners and 600
 other Cubans imprisoned for minor
 crimes at the rate of 400 prisoners per
 month.74
 Instead of responding to the prisoner
 release program with enthusiasm, as
 might have been expected, the Carter
 administration responded with suspicion,
 largely because progress on the human
 rights front was not matched by any
 change in Cuba's foreign policy. Pro-
 cessing of political prisoner immigra-
 tion applications lagged far behind the
 number of applicants. Despite Castro's
 demand that the United States accept all
 those released who indicated a desire to
 resettle there, Attorney General Griffin
 Bell continued personally to review each
 file, with the stated purpose of excluding
 "spies, terrorists, and common crimi-
 nals."75 Castro, in turn, announced his
 willingness to meet with exile represen-
 tatives again to discuss how releases to
 the United States could be effectuated
 should the Carter administration refuse
 to accept them.76
 Although President Carter shortly
 thereafter pledged to do his "utmost to
 ease the plight ... of released political
 prisoners" and expressed his "hope that
 we will always stand ready to welcome
 more than our fair share of those who
 flee their homelands because of racial,
 economic, or religious oppression,"77 and
 74. New York Times, 22 Nov. 1978, p. 2.
 75. New York Times, 25 Nov. 1978, p. 25,
 correcting account of 19 Nov. 1975 remarks.
 76. "Castro Would Free 3000," New York
 Times, 23 Nov. 1978, p. 7.
 77. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"
 Remarks by President Carter, 6 Dec. 1978, Weekly
 Compilation of Presidential Documents,
 14(49):2163 (11 Dec. 1978).
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 although the pace of admissions did
 increase, the political prisoner release
 program, as a unilateral Castro initia-
 tive, was never enthusiastically embraced
 by the United States. Indeed hundreds
 of former political prisoners were still
 seeking entry when the 1980 influx began,
 and the issue had become a source of
 acute Cuban grievance against the Uni-
 ted States.
 From the U.S. perspective, Cuba's
 external policies, its alignment with the
 Soviet Union, and its activities in Africa
 were of central concern and overrode in
 importance Castro's concessions on the
 political prisoner issue. Moreover dur-
 ing 1979, new U.S. concerns subsequently
 arose, such as Cuba's increasingly close
 military relationship with the Soviet
 Union and Cuba's growing willingness
 to become involved in the Caribbean
 and Central America. In response, the
 Carter administration in 1979 decided
 to switch from a policy toward Cuba
 based on efforts to normalize relations
 to a concerted effort to discourage Cuba's
 involvement in the region. Presidential
 Directive 52 called for increased eco-
 nomic aid and sales of military equip-
 ment to allied governments in the region,
 and the U.S. took a series of additional
 steps, including renewal of spy-plane
 flights, the establishment by the United
 States of a Joint Caribbean Task Force,
 and military maneuvers at the Guanta-
 namo naval base.78
 The 1980 influx not only took place
 in the context of a rapidly deteriorating
 bilateral relationship but was, at the
 very least, also hastened by the extensive
 visitation of large numbers of Cuban
 Americans to Cuba in 1979. If Castro
 intended those visits to generate more
 78. Sklar, Cuban Exodus, p. 28.
 sympathy for his regime from the group
 most vocally and violently opposed to it,
 he apparently failed. Instead the group
 most influenced were Cubans who had
 never left and were impressed by the
 wealth and the well-being of their main-
 land visitors, as well as by renewal of
 contact with long-departed friends and
 relatives.
 The visitation program highlighted
 not only the attractiveness of the United
 States, but also "the sea of difficul-
 ties,"79 economic and political, in which
 Cuba continued to swim. Cuba in 1979
 and 1980, plagued by its overdepen-
 dence on an unsatisfactory and under-
 priced sugar crop, had entered into a
 new era of hardships. Accompanying
 this deprivation were new political cam-
 paigns launched against the nation's
 nonproductive and undesirable citizens,
 including its homosexuals and petty
 criminals. The visits by Cuban Ameri-
 cans did not create the dissatisfaction
 with conditions in Cuba that was then
 endemic, but they did serve as a catalyst
 by emphasizing the attractiveness of the
 migration alternative.
 When Castro, on 4 April 1980, opened
 the gates of the Peruvian embassy to
 more than 10,000 Cubans seeking to
 leave their country, the United States
 was confronted with that alternative
 and the necessity of responding to it. A
 further response was required on 19
 April when Castro opened Mariel Har-
 bor and in the months thereafter when
 the Marielitos continued to arrive in
 Florida. Under those policies that had
 prevailed in 1959-62 and 1965-73, the
 U.S. response in each instance would
 79. The phrase is from a speech made by Fidel
 Castro in December 1979. It is quoted and ana-
 lyzed in Rivera, "Cuban and Haitian Influxes," p.
 291.
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 have been unreservedly positive, al-
 though attempts to secure an orderly
 departure program might have ensued.
 By 1980, however, a decade of pronor-
 malization arguments and initiatives had
 robbed a new and massive Cuban immi-
 gration program of its ideological appeal.
 Caught in a new and more complex
 calculus of response, the Carter admin-
 istration found itself weighing a variety
 of reasons for welcoming Cubans warmly
 or discouraging their entry. Favoring
 generosity were a well-publicized human
 rights policy, a campaign to win the elec-
 toral support of the large Cuban-Ameri-
 can community in Florida, and the
 attacks of candidate Ronald Reagan,
 "who blasted Carter's efforts to bar
 refugees."80 Favoring restriction were a
 new refugee act-which permitted the
 admission of large numbers of refugees
 but required that they demonstrate fear
 of persecution as their motive for depar-
 ture-growing national concern over
 uncontrolled immigration, and a sense
 that Castro was exploiting the migra-
 tion fever to export Cubans deemed, not
 only by Cuba but also by the United
 States, undesirable. By forcing boat
 skippers to carry several thousand insti-
 tutionalized persons to the United States
 and by actively involving the Cuban
 government in the direction of traffic
 into and out of Mariel, Castro magni-
 fied this concern. Deteriorating relations
 with Congress over Cuba, occasioned
 largely by the Carter administration's
 indecisive response to the Soviet combat
 brigade originally believed stationed
 there, required that Carter take a hard
 line with Castro, yet President Carter's
 own rhetoric required that genuine
 refugees be received warmly.
 80. LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," p.
 111.
 Had Carter been able to exploit the
 1980 flow and to argue forcefully, con-
 sistently, and often that the Marielitos
 were in fact voting with their feet, that
 their motivations were primarily politi-
 cal rather than economic, that the "dregs
 of Cuban society" made up only a small
 and manageable part of the 1980 refugee
 cohort, then the gap between these con-
 flicting objectives might have been
 bridged, and some of the negative effect
 of the flotilla's ungoverned arrival mit-
 igated. However, despite a January 1980
 State Department Human Rights report
 highly critical of the "totalitarian Marxist-
 Leninist system" in Cuba and its effect
 on the Cuban people,81 despite remarks
 by President Carter just days before the
 boatlift began comparing Cuba to East
 Berlin as a place desperate to keep its
 dissenters in,82 and despite Vice-President
 Mondale's early effort to make political
 capital out of the influx, no consistent
 effort to turn the 1980 exodus into an
 asset rather than a liability occurred.
 Instead, the first decision reached for
 those occupying the Peruvian embassy
 was that they would be admitted to the
 United States only if they met U.S.
 immigration requirements or entered
 the political prisoner program.83 On 15
 April President Carter invoked his pow-
 ers under the new refugee act to desig-
 nate 3500 of the Cubans in the Peruvian
 81. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports
 on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (Washing-
 ton, DC: Government Printing Offices, 1980), pp.
 291-97.
 82. Speech before the American Society of
 Newspaper Editors, 10 Apr. 1980, in Public Pap-
 ers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81
 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
 1981), vol. 1, p. 642.
 83. New York Times, 6 Apr. 1980, p. 4.
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 embassy as refugees admissible to the
 United States.84
 Yet no similar action was taken later
 with the throng waiting to leave Mariel85
 or with those who had landed in Flor-
 ida. Instead during the first weeks of the
 boatlift, the Carter administration wel-
 comed with one hand while it waved the
 boats away with the other. Carter's
 "open heart and open arms"86 speech
 followed by three days a White House
 statement that the INS was concerned
 about criminals in the flotilla and would
 carefully screen each arrival.87 Until 15
 May, when the Coast Guard began
 actively interfering with boat traffic head-
 ing to pick up passengers from Cuba,
 threats of reprisals against boat owners
 alternated with Coast Guard sailing
 instructions on how best to make the
 round trip from Mariel.88 Only the State
 84. "Cuban Refugees in the Peruvian Embassy
 in Havana," White House Statement, 14 Apr.
 1980, in Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy
 Carter, 1980-81, vol. 1, p. 682.
 85. Senator Kennedy urged such a use of the
 Refugee Act in a public letter to the president on
 20 May 1980. See Congressional Record, 6 June
 1980, S.6436-37.
 86. "League of Women Voters," Remarks and
 a Question-and-Answer Session, 5 May 1980, in
 Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter,
 1980-81, vol. 1, pp. 833-34.
 87. "Cuban Refugees, White House Announce-
 ment of Federal Actions in Response to the Emer-
 gency," 2 May 1980, ibid., vol. 1, p. 819.
 88. In the weeks before President Carter an-
 nounced his intention of using the Coast Guard to
 stop the boat traffic from Mariel Harbor, it had
 been used for precisely the opposite purpose.
 According to one newspaper account, "As thou-
 sands of Cubans continue to express abhorrence
 of Fidel Castro's rule of their homeland by stream-
 ing away from it in anything that can float, the
 U.S. Coast Guard is laboring mightily to ensure
 their safe arrival on these shores in one of the
 Department maintained a consistent per-
 spective. Its opposition to the boatlift
 marked a new recognition that in mass-
 asylum situations in this hemisphere,
 particularly those involving Cuba, it is
 no longer possible to rely on cold war
 ideology and label all who leave as refu-
 gees without first examining their eco-
 nomic situation and their true motives
 for departure.
 CONCLUSION
 To date, the lessons of Mariel have
 been almost exclusively negative. Cu-
 bans, who for foreign policy reasons
 were automatically classified as refugees
 in the past, are unlikely to be granted
 especially favorable immigration treat-
 ment so long as they are regarded, in the
 words of former White House Assistant
 Jack Watson, "as bullets aimed at this
 country."89 As Elliot Abrams's June
 1982 speech confirms,90 the Reagan admin-
 istration is likely to regard any new
 Cuban influx in terms of this metaphor.
 But as that speech also confirms, the
 traditional view of Cubans voting with
 their feet appeals to the administration's
 strong anticommunist, anti-Castro sen-
 timents. The policy dilemma posed by
 any renewal of significant Cuban flow
 appears insoluble, unless refugee admis-
 sions-and particularly the asylum pro-
 cedures that will govern the admission
 of future Cuban boat people-are sub-
 stantially depoliticized.
 biggest peacetime operations it has ever mounted."
 "Coast Guard Shepherding Cubans from Danger
 to Succor: Small Boat Armada Depends on
 'Mothering' by Cutters," Christian Science Moni-
 tor, 8 May 1980.
 89. Rivera, "Cuban and Haitian Influxes," p.
 292.
 90. Abrams, "Human Rights and the Refugee
 Crisis."
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